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1 Introduction
This paper develops a model in which it is assumed that rms cannot pay discriminate
based on year of entry to a rm there are no cohort e¤ectswithin a rm and develops
an equilibrium model of wage dynamics and unemployment. The model is developed under
the assumption of worker risk aversion, and also mobility, so that workers can costlessly
quit jobs at any time. Firms on the other hand are risk neutral and are committed to
contracts. Firms have to trade-o¤ the desire to insure their risk-averse workers against
the need to respond to market conditions to not only prevent their workers from quitting
but also, because of equal treatment of workers, to take advantage of states of the world
where labor is cheap. We solve for the dynamics of wages and unemployment when the
only exogenous variable is productivity shocks.
We show that real wages exhibit a degree of downward rigidity due to the desire to
insure incumbent workers. In periods in which workersoutside options are low, absent
equal treatment, rms would o¤er a lower wage (and hence cheaper) contract to new
entrants while holding constant incumbentswages (for insurance reasons). With the equal
treatment assumption, however, new entrants must be o¤ered the same as incumbents from
the point they join the rm. Firms will limit how far they allow wages to fall in order to
avoid too much variability in the contract that incumbents signed up to; consequently the
value of the contract may not fall su¢ ciently to match the outside option. That is, we
nd that there is a maximum rate of decline in the wage, no matter how low the outside
option falls. The reverse is not true however; in periods when the outside option is high
the continuation contract rises to match the outside option. Because of costless mobility
of workers, rms have no choice but to do this.1
The linking of the pay of new hires to that of incumbents means that wage rigidity
1 In the model we assume that the driving process in the economy is a productivity shock common to
all rms. Since the outside option will be endogenized, the reader may wonder whether nonetheless equal
treatment may dampen upward movements in wages: if all rms respond to positive shocks by not raising
wages very much then the outside option will also not rise very much. However, this would create excess
demand for labor and a rm would try to raise its a wage a fraction above other wages. We show that
equilibrium can only occur when the contract species market clearing wages whenever the outside option
constraint binds.
1
also has implications for employment levels. Obviously wage rigidity for incumbents need
not imply deviations from e¢ cient outcomes so long as hiring is at the e¢ cient level (in our
base model workers only separate for exogenous reasons). We show however that (under
certain conditions) rms hire up to the point where the real wage equals the marginal
product of labor; to the extent then that wages do not correspond to market-clearing
levels hiring will be ine¢ cient; as argued above, we show that this occurs only in the
direction of wages being too high leading to ine¢ ciently low employment and an excess
supply of labor.2
A striking feature of our solution is that the equilibrium paths for wages and employ-
ment depend only on the realized sequence of productivity shocks, and in a particularly
simple fashion. Amongst other things it implies that we do not need to specify a proba-
bility distribution for the shocks in order to simulate the model. This allows us to take a
very lightly parameterized model to the data, and we argue that even our very rudimen-
tary model, when fed sectoral productivity shocks from the post-war U.S. economy, does
reasonably well in accounting for unemployment uctuations. The main contribution of
the paper is thus to analyze the dynamic implications of equal treatment constraints, and
to derive empirical implications of such constraints.
Our approach in the paper is to examine the implications for wage and employment
dynamics of imposing equal treatment. We argue that there is a good deal of anecdotal
evidence supporting the assumption, and that more formal testing has not rejected it.
However, we will also argue that equal treatment can arise endogenously in an extension
of our model. If contracting is at will, so that rms can costlessly terminate an individual
workers contract, then committing to equal treatment if this is possible will be an
optimal strategy for a rm. The idea is that if it does not do so, then workers accepting a
contract which o¤ers insurance will anticipate being undercut in bad states of the world
and substituted by cheaper workers. To be able to credibly o¤er insurance, then, which
2 In Gertler and Trigari (2006) in the context of a matching model with staggered multiperiod wage
bargaining, new hires are also brought in at the same wage as incumbents. This implies that the wage
stickiness that results in the model is transmitted to the extensive margin via hiring decisions. This leads
to amplication of the volatilities of vacancies and unemployment to empirically plausible levels. See also
Thomas (2005) who shows that cross-contract restrictions can increase the volatility of employment.
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reduces the ex ante wage bill, rms must commit not to undercut.3
The paper builds on Beaudry and DiNardo (1991). They develop a model of labor
contracting where a risk-neutral rm o¤ers insurance to risk-averse employees but in which
there is no worker commitment (perfect mobility). Wages follow a ratchet-like process,
rising when productivity is higher than previously, but staying constant otherwise. The
downward wage rigidity in their perfect mobility model provides insurance to the worker
but does not directly a¤ect employment decisions, unlike here.
An outline of the paper is as follows. We start by outlining the basic assumptions in
Section 2. A simple two-period example is presented in Section 2.1. The general model
is described and solved in Section 2.2. In 3.1 we allow for separation rates to vary with
experience; in 3.2 we show that equal treatment arises in equilibrium if labor contracts
are at will,and we also discuss evidence and related literature; in 3.3 we argue that the
results are robust to relaxing the worker mobility assumption. We then look at generalizing
the model to include layo¤s and rm-specic shocks in 3.4 and 3.5. In Section 4 we simulate
the model using sectoral TFP data from the postwar US economy to generate predictions
of unemployment movements. Finally Section 5 contains concluding comments.
2 The model
We start by outlining the basic ingredients of the model, then we present an example
before we ll out further details and solve the general model.
Time runs from t = 1; 2; 3 : : : T , where T  2 is nite, and there is a single nonstorable
consumption good each period. There are a large number of workers, assumed to be
identical (we abstract from any tenure or experience e¤ects on productivity), except for
their birth/death dates. Workers are risk averse with per period twice di¤erentiable utility
3See Menzio and Moen (2008), who in independent work also nd that a lack of commitment not to
replace leads to amplied employment uctuations relative to a model in which the feature is absent.
Their model and main focus di¤er in many respects from ours: the labor market is one of directed search,
rms live for two periods only, and rm entry plays an important role in employment uctuations. They
model a more nuanced relationship between the wages of incumbents and new hires than our competitive
framework permits. By contrast our model allows us to focus on richer wage and employment dynamics.
(See also Menzio (2005) for a somewhat related mechanism.)
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function u(w); u0 > 0; u00 < 0; where w  0 is income, which must be consumed within the
period it is assumed that they can neither save nor borrow. There is no disutility of work,
but hours are xed, so that workers are either employed or unemployed. Assume that if
workers are not employed in a period, they receive some low consumption level c  0: There
is a large (but xed) number of identical risk-neutral rms. Each rm has a diminishing
returns technology with output at t given by F (N; st); @F=@N > 0; @2F=@N2 < 0; where
N is labor input and st is the date t productivity shock (the sole source of uctuations).
It is assumed that a rm must always retain some (minimum measure of) workers each
period.4 Workers and rms discount the future with respective factors w; f 2 (0; 1].5 ;6
For an employed worker, there is a stayingprobability of  2 (0; 1) ; each period,
so workers exogenously separate from their rm with probability 1   ; moreover with
probability  separated workers must seek work at a di¤erent rm and with probability
1    they die (exit the market); the same death probability of (1   )(1   ) applies
to the unemployed. Separation occurs at the end of a period so that separated workers
who do not exit but nd a job in the following period do not su¤er any unemployment.
The number dying is replaced by the same number of new entrants. We assume there are
a large number of workers relative to the number of rms, but for notational simplicity
we normalize the ratio of workers to rms to be one each period.7 We assume that the
spot wage/full employment (N = 1) solution is always greater than the unemployment
consumption level, i.e., that @F=@N(1; st) > c all t:
The state of nature st; which is observed at the start of period t before any decisions
are made, follows a Markov process, with initial xed value s1; nite state space S, and
transition probabilities sr  0.8 Let ht  (s1; s2; : : : ; st) be the history at t. The labor
4This can be motivated by an assumption that some knowledge must be passed on from one generation
of workers to the next.
5Allowing for asymmetric discounting will be useful when we come to the empirical exercise.
6The model can be closed in a variety of ways without a¤ecting the labor market equilibrium, for
example by assuming that rms are owned by a class of agents who do not provide labor services, and who
consume prots each period, with c being home production.
7Thus we take the fraction of a rms workforce leaving to be exactly (1   ). If N was nite, then
the fraction leaving a rm would be random, and it can be shown that the contract could be improved by
conditioning on this. (An alternative assumption to N large would be to simply rule out contracts that
condition on this fraction on the grounds that verication may be impossible.)
8We use a Markov process to x ideas, although the arguments go through for more general stochastic
processes.
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market o¤ers a worker currently looking for work (at the start of t) an expected utility
(discounted to t) which is denoted by t(ht). We shall refer to this as the outside option.
We assume symmetry at the start of t between the situation of a worker who is
currently employed and one who is not attached to a rm, by assuming that a worker who
quits their current employer at t joins the nonassigned at the start of t and so also gets
t(ht). In the base model, workers can costlessly quit. Thus a rm must o¤er at least
t(ht) to prevent its workers from quitting. We distinguish this from t (ht) ; dened as
the utility a rm must o¤er to hire. The labor market is modelled as being competitive:
if it clears then both t and t equal the common utility o¤ered by rms. It may be,
however, that there is excess supply of labor. In this case, it is assumed that workers who
are not assigned to a rm at the start of t (the surviving unemployed from t  1; plus the
surviving separated from the end of t  1; together with new entrants and quitters at the
start of t) will accept a contract if it o¤ers at least the utility from remaining unemployed,
so 
t
is this value. Each nonassigned worker gets a job with the same probability, given by
the number of (acceptable) new jobs divided by the number of nonassigned workers, and
in this case t would equal utility averaged across getting a job and remaining unemployed
using this probability, and is thus no smaller than the latter, and hence no smaller than

t
.9 Since rms must retain some workers, they must o¤er at least t and this will always
guarantee they can also hire as many workers as they like. Thus the relevant participation
constraint with costless worker mobility is that a rm must always o¤er at least t:
10
We summarize the timing as follows. At date 1 each rm o¤ers a single state-
contingent wage contract (wt(ht))
T
t=1 to which it is committed. The fact that it cannot o¤er
subsequent hires a di¤erent contract captures the equal treatment restriction. Workers ac-
cept contracts and period 1 production takes place. At the end of period 1; a rm loses a
fraction (1  ) of its workforce due to exogenous separation. At the start of each subse-
quent period t  2; rms and workers observe st. Attached workers may quit costlessly at
9The separated at the end of t 1 who manage to nd work at t do not su¤er a period of unemployment.
10Many of the ne details of how excess supply is modelled do not a¤ect the solution for the paths of
wages and employment in the symmetric equilibrium. For example, employment probabilities could di¤er
among the di¤erent categories of the nonassigned, or the minimum utility that a nonassigned worker will
accept could be higher than the unemployment utility; what is critical is that t is no more than the utility
o¤ered by an employment contract.
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this point and join the pool of those previously separated, the surviving unemployed from
t 1 and new entrants (and receive t). However, provided the continuation utility o¤ered
by the contract at least matches t; the rm is able to retain its workers and hire in as
many new workers as it requires from the pool of those previously separated. Production
takes place and wages wt (ht) are paid, and the period ends.
2.1 A two-period example
Before we proceed further, we shall deal with an example. This illustrates the main ideas
while avoiding a number of complications. There are two periods (t = 1; 2). The state of
nature st is represented by productivity at : a1 is xed and a2 equals either a2 or a2 with
equal probability, a2 < a1 < a2. We assume no discounting, and  = 1 (so all separated
workers remain in the market and there is no death).
The representative rm o¤ers a wage contract in period 1, which we denote as
(w1; w2; w2) using obvious notation, and has an employment plan
 
N1; N2; N2

: Notice
that the equal treatment restriction is captured by the fact that the rm is constrained
to pay new hires, in period 2; w2 or w2 depending on the state, the same wage as the
incumbents receive.
The problem faced by the rm11 is to choose a contract and an employment plan to:
maxE
2X
t=1
(F (Nt; at) Ntwt) (Problem A1)
subject to the participation constraints
u(w1) + E (u(w2) + (1  )2)  1 (1)
at date 1, and
u (w2)  2 (2)
in both states in period 2. The value of the outside option in period 1; 1; is simply the
equilibrium utility a worker can get from any rm; 2 in period 2 is likewise the utility from
the equilibrium wage if there is full employment since a worker who quits is guaranteed
11We ignore the possibility of layo¤s, assuming that the loss of workers due to exogenous separation is
larger than any desired reduction in the labor force.
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a job elsewhere, but its value will be less if there is unemployment as a worker who quits
will get a new job with probability less than one; the worker must take her chances with
the other new entrants.12 The rst-order conditions include N1 = u0 (w1) where  is the
multiplier on (1), and N2 = u
0 (w2) if (2) is not binding in the bad state, in which case
u0 (w2)
u0 (w1)
=
N2
N1
: (3)
Equation (3) implies there is an optimal rate of fall of wages in this state even though a
lower wage at t = 2 is feasible and would allow the rm to bring in new hires at a cheaper
rate.
This is critical for our approach: wages may not fall fast enough to clear the labor
market. Suppose that F (N; at) = atLogN with a1 = 1; and a2 taking values 1:1 and 0:9;
so productivity growth is 10%, and let u(w) =  w 1: Let c = 0:8 and  = 0:87. The
marginal productivity of labor at N = 1 is at and this implies that the spot market
solution (i.e., what would prevail in the absence of contracts) would have wt = at:
The symmetric equilibrium with equal treatment contracts, derived below in general,
has w1 = 1 (the spot solution), w2 = 1:1 (the spot solution), w2 = 0:966 (> 0:9, the
spot solution); i.e., the wage in the bad state at t = 2 does not fall su¢ ciently to clear
the labor market. The ability of workers to quit implies that in the good state the rm
cannot stabilize the wage for wage smoothing purposes but must match the higher value
of productivity, and there is full employment. In the low productivity state there is
employment of 0:93, i.e., an unemployment rate of 7%, and the participation constraint is
slack (a worker who quits will at best get the same wage at another rm, but she may end
up unemployed). Any attempt to cut w2 further will lead to an increase in overall wage
costs because the need to compensate period 1 hires for the extra wage variability more
than o¤sets the fact that period 2 hires could be brought in at a lower wage.
The example illustrates a number of features that arise in the general solution.
121 is equilibrium worker utility discounted to period 1, that is, u(w

1)+E (u(w

2) + (1  )2) ; where
the  superscripts denote equilibrium values. If there is no unemployment at t = 2, then 2 = u (w

2);
if there is (i.e., N2 < 1) 2 = ((N

2   ) = (1  ))u(w2)+ ((1 N2 ) = (1  ))u(c). Thus 2 < u (w2) as
u(c) < u(w2) (see below).
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 Provided the rm is always hiring, employment is determined by wage = marginal
productivity of labor. Intuitively, an extra worker employed at t can be neutralized
at t + 1 by reducing hiring; thus protability of an extra hire at t depends only on
marginal productivity relative to the current wage.
 When there is full employment, the equilibrium wage equals marginal productivity
at N = 1 and the participation constraint binds; otherwise the wage exceeds this
spot solution and the participation constraint is slack.
 To solve the problem one can compute the wage change that follows from (3), i.e.,
ignoring the period 2 participation constraint in any state this is a type of Euler
equation which solves the problem of trading o¤ the rms desire to smooth the
wages of its period 1 incumbents (which reduces the discounted wages it has to o¤er
them) against the wish to take advantage of lower wages paid to new hires in period
2; and note that the period 1 wage is the spot solution.13 If the implied wage in
period 2 lies above the spot solution wage, then the period 2 participation constraint
does not bind and there is unemployment; otherwise there is full employment and
the wage is at the spot solution. We show below that the same argument can be
used to compute the wage at any date t+ 1 given the wage at t.
 The latter implies that there is a degree of downward, but not upward, wage rigidity.
 Computing the wage in the second period by comparing the wage which satises
the Euler equation with the spot wage also implies that the wage in each state
can be computed independently of other states or their probabilities. This also
generalizes and implies notably that the model can be simulated by inputting a
realized sequence of productivity shocks; that is, the solution does not require the
distribution of shocks to be known.
How would the solution di¤er if the equal treatment constraint was not imposed? The
optimal contract would then be of the type analyzed by Beaudry and DiNardo (1991):
wages would be fully downward rigid, rising to the spot level in the good state; in the bad
13N can be solved out in (3) by noting that wage equals marginal product of labor.
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state new hires would be brought in at a lower wage (in fact at a2). There would be no
unemployment.
2.2 The General Model
2.2.1 The Firms problem
We work with a representative rm. At the start of date 1; after s1 is observed, rms
commit to contracts (wt(ht))
T
t=1, wt (ht)  0, which we assume are not binding on workers.
We assume equal treatment: a worker joining subsequently, at  after history h , is o¤ered
a continuation of this same contract: (wt(ht))
T
t= . Each rm also has an employment plan
(Nt(ht))
T
t=1, where Nt (ht)  0: Let Vt (ht) denote the continuation utility from t onwards
from the contract, dened recursively by:
Vt (ht) = u(wt(ht)) + wE

Vt+1 (ht+1) + (1  )t+1 j ht

; (4)
with VT+1 = 0, where E denotes expectation, and the term involving t+1 reects the
utility after exogenous separation but no death.
Our aim is to construct an equilibrium in which layo¤s do not occur, largely because it
substantially simplies the analytics of the solution. In fact, we will state the optimization
problem imposing no layo¤s, to avoid complicating the statement of the problem, and
later derive parameter restrictions for which this remains a solution even if layo¤s are
permitted.14
The problem faced by the rm, which takes (t)
T
t=1 as parametric, is:
max
(wt(ht))
T
t=1;(Nt(ht))
T
t=1
E
"
TX
t=1
(f )
t 1 (F (Nt(ht); st) Nt(ht)wt(ht))
#
(Problem A)
subject to
Vt (ht)  t (ht) (5)
14Thus given that the rate of separation is exogenous, movements in unemployment in our base model
occur through changes in hiring. This is arguably consistent with the evidence reviewed in Hall (2005)
who argues that the separation rate is roughly constant (see also Pissarides (1986), Shimer (2005)), and
that although job losses rise during recessions, the increase is usually very small in relation to the normal
levels of separations. However, these conclusions have been disputed, e.g., Davis (2005), Fujita and Ramey
(2007), Elsby, Michaels, and Solon (2009). Our base model does not account for the fact that layo¤s play a
major role in downturns (e.g., Davis (2005)) as we treat separations as exogenous. The analysis of Section
3.4 suggests that introducing layo¤s would imply that their share of total separations is countercyclical,
and the separation rate itself would become countercyclical.
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for all positive probability ht; T  t  1, and
Nt(ht 1; s)  Nt 1(ht 1) (6)
for all positive probability ht 1; all s 2 S with st 1s > 0; T  t  2. (5) is the
participation constraint that says that at any point the contract must o¤er at least what
a worker can get by quitting, while (6) imposes that the rm may not layo¤ workers.15
2.2.2 Equilibrium
We shall use a  superscript to denote equilibrium values. To close the model we impose
an equation specifying the equilibrium determination, given (wt (ht))
T
t=1 ; (N

t (ht))
T
t=1 ; of
the outside option:
t =
Nt   Nt 1
1  Nt 1
V t +
1 Nt
1  Nt 1
Ut; (7)
N0 = 0, where V t is the equilibrium contract o¤er at t (the denominator is the number
of workers not retained after t  1) and Ut is the discounted utility of a worker who fails
to nd work at t which is given by
Ut(ht) = u(c) + w (1  (1  ) (1  ))E

t+1 j ht

; (8)
i.e., the utility from the reservation wage plus future utility assuming survival (with proba-
bility (1  (1  ) (1  ))) from not having a job at the beginning of t+1. In interpreting
(7), note that there are two cases : if the labor market at time t clears, Nt (ht) = 1, then
from (7) t (ht) must o¤er the utility o¤ered by other rms. In symmetric equilibrium,
other rms are o¤ering an identical contract, and so it is the utility associated with this,
V t (ht) ; which must be o¤ered. If, on the other hand, there is excess supply of labor,16
Nt (ht) < 1, the outside opportunity will depend on the probability of getting a job, and
recall we assumed that all unattached workers have equal probability of getting work.17
15More precisely, (6) implies layo¤s are not needed. However the denition of Vt(ht) in (4) implies that
a worker remains with the rm unless exogenously separated, so together these two assumptions rule out
layo¤s.
16 Intuitively, as noted earlier, the case of excess demand for labor cannot arise in equilibrium, as an
innitessimally small increase in the wage would cure the individual rms supply problem. In contrast,
because of equal treatment the case of excess supply can arise since workers cannot undercut.
17When there is unemployment (Nt < 1), we assumed that rms can hire at Ut, the utility of the
unemployed. It follows from (7) that Ut < t, which justies the earlier discussion that matching the
outside option t is the appropriate constraint.
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Given the endpoint condition T+1 = 0, (7), (4) and (8) uniquely determine Ut; V

t
and t.
We can summarize:
Denition 1

(wt (ht))
T
t=1 ; (N

t (ht))
T
t=1

constitutes a symmetric no layo¤ equilibrium
(SNLE) if it solves Problem A where (t)
T
t=1 is determined recursively from (4), (7) and
(8).
Lemma 1 below gives necessary conditions for wage changes in an optimal contract.
Lemma 1 In an optimal contract with perfect mobility (i.e., a solution to Problem A),
u0 (wt+1(ht; s))
u0 (wt(ht))
 fNt+1(ht; s)
wNt(ht)
(9)
must hold; it can only hold strictly (<) if the participation constraint binds at (ht; s):
Lemma 1 implies that there will be a lower bound on the fall of real wages; even if
the labor market is slack at t+ 1, the rm will not want to cut the wage too far because
of the desire to insure incumbents. Once this point is reached, the wage will not fall faster
no matter how low the supply price of outside workers (so new hires will strictly want to
work for the rm in this case).
We can prove Lemma 1 with the aid of a simple variational argument.18 The general
strategy is to start with an optimal wage contract and then consider the change in prots
arising from shu­ ing wages over any two adjacent periods. Then by optimality of the
original contract we know that the resulting changes in prots must be nonpositive. This
nonpositivity condition will in turn give us a bound on the rate of change of marginal
utilities and hence wages between two periods. We end up with a condition that limits the
18We can also use standard recursive arguments to derive (9) and solve the model. However Lemma
1 does not require any of the technical restrictions we later introduce. In fact it applies quite generally,
relying only on risk sharing subject to a sequence of participation constraints, and so might serve as a
general test of equal treatment models. For example, it would still apply if employment determination is
modelled di¤erently, for example due to a non-competitive product market, or subject to adjustment costs.
It holds even if there are layo¤s provided layo¤ probabilities can be committed to (see Footnote 42 below).
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rate of fall of wages in a recession. It will transpire that this plus a wage-equals-marginal-
product result proved below will completely specify the dynamics of equilibrium wages
for any given sequence of productivity shocks.
Proof of Lemma 1. Starting from the optimal contract, consider reshu­ ing wages
between t and t+ 1 in state s; to backload them. Increase the wage at t+ 1 after state s
by a small amount ; and cut the wage at t by x so as to leave the worker indi¤erent; do
not change the contract otherwise. This implies that
stswu
0 (wt+1(ht; s))  u0 (wt(ht))x ' 0: (10)
This backloading satises all participation constraints: worker utility rises at t + 1; and
so from this point on constraints are satised; similarly, participation constraints are also
satised both after ht and earlier because utility is held constant over the two periods.
The change in prots (viewed from ht) arising from the backloading is
P =  stsfNt+1+Ntx
(where Nt+1  Nt+1 (ht; s) etc. ). Using (10) to eliminate x gives the change in prots as
P '  stsfNt+1+
stswu
0 (wt+1(ht; s))Nt
u0 (wt(ht))
: (11)
The change in prots cannot be positive by optimality of the original contract, i.e.,P  0;
so using (11) and rearranging we establish (9) (i.e., by considering  su¢ ciently small the
approximation in (11) can be made arbitrarily precise).
To prove the second part, consider frontloading wages, i.e., repeat the above argu-
ments but for a decrease in the wage at t + 1 of ; o¤set by an increase of x at t: Note
that in this case the t+1 participation constraint will be violated if it is binding initially.
By an analogous argument to the above, frontloading is protable if
u0 (wt+1(ht; s))
u0 (wt(ht))
<
fNt+1(ht; s)
Nt(ht)w
;
i.e., if (9) holds with strict inequality. In this case the t+ 1 participation constraint must
bind, as otherwise frontloading would be undertaken and prots would increase.
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The critical idea is that backloading the contract cannot violate participation con-
straints; hence the contract will always be backloaded at least until the optimal dynamic
rst-order condition is attained, or beyond if the participation constraint at t+1 binds. So
in an optimal contract there is an unconstrained wage Euler equation, or target marginal
utility growth rate:
u0 (wt+1(ht; s))
u0 (wt(ht))
=
fN
s
t+1
Ntw
(12)
which will be maintained, unless a binding participation constraint at t + 1 forces it to
be lower. Equivalently, this puts a lower bound on how fast real wages can decline, but a
tight labor market at t + 1 can imply that wage growth is not against this bound. Note
that this lemma applies whether or not the rm is hiring at t or t+ 1.
To understand the intuition for (12), suppose f = w; so marginal utility grows at
rate N st+1=Nt. In the absence of equal treatment, this rate would be unity incumbents
wages are stabilized (as in Beaudry and DiNardo) if the future participation constraint is
not binding. Here, if N st+1=Nt > 1, however, the rm is taking on additional workers at
t+1 who will receive the same wage as the incumbents; hence the future wage is taken into
account with a larger weight by the rm than by the incumbent worker, and this imparts a
downward bias to the future incumbent wage in comparison with the discrimination case.
One implication of this is that the smaller is  (i.e., the higher the rate of turnover),
the smaller is the degree of downward rigidity. Intuitively, as turnover approaches 100%,
there is very little to be gained by smoothing incumbentswages, so the rm will cut wages
whenever it can. Du-Caju, Fuss, and Wintr (2007) is the one paper we are aware of which
has looked at wage rigidity and turnover, and indeed nds that rms with higher rates of
turnover do appear to have wages that are less rigid downwards.19
We now establish that in equilibrium wages are always equal to the marginal product
of labor. Together with the conditions in Lemma 1 this completely characterizes the
dynamics of equilibrium wages for any given productivity sequence.
19They argue that this is consistent with a turnover-cost e¢ ciency wage model: rms which su¤er high
costs from a given level of turnover are more likely to invest in long-term contracting mechanisms, including
more rigid wages, in order to minimize turnover. Thus lower turnover and more rigidity will go together
in the data.
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To proceed, we shall provisionally assume that rms always hire (at all ht) in equi-
librium. That is to say, we proceed on the supposition that the constraint (6) in problem
A never binds in the solution. We characterize the solution if this is the case, and later
nd conditions on a specic parametrization for which the solution satises this property.
Finally we verify that this is also a solution to the problem even if layo¤s are permitted
(i.e., without (6)). Then employment is determined by a standard marginal productivity
equation:
Lemma 2 If in an SNLE hiring takes place at every ht; then Nt (ht) satises
@F (Nt (ht); st)=@N = w

t (ht): (13)
Proof. Suppose that @F (Nt (ht); st)=@N > wt (ht): It is feasible to increase current
hiring holding the wage contract constant, and consider this as the only change to the
rms plan: An increase in current hiring by  > 0, for  small enough, and holding the
wage constant at wt (ht), would lead to an increase in current prots. At the same time,
holding employment at t+1 constant at Nt+1(ht+1) in all states (so hiring falls by ), is
feasible for  small enough given hiring is positive at t + 1. Thus there is an increase in
prots at t; and no change at other dates, contradicting prot maximization. A symmetric
argument, using the fact that current hiring is positive so can be reduced by ; and that
t+ 1 employment can be increased by , rules out @F (Nt (ht); st)=@N < wt (ht):
Suppose that at some t; the participation constraint binds. Then there must be full
employment and the wage is determined by marginal productivity at full employment:
Lemma 3 Consider an SNLE in which hiring always occurs; then the participation con-
straint binds at ht if and only if Nt (ht) = 1; moreover if the constraint binds then
wt (ht) = @F (1; st)=@N:
Proof. (i) Suppose that Nt (ht) < 1: Under the hiring hypothesis, we know from
Lemma 2 that @F (Nt (ht); st)=@N = wt (ht) > c by the assumption on c and diminishing
marginal productivity (i.e., wt (ht)  c would imply Nt (ht) > 1). So a worker who fails
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to get a job is strictly worse o¤, and thus V t (ht) >  (st) (cf. (7) and (8)) and so the
participation constraint does not bind. On the other hand, if Nt (ht) = 1 then from (7),
V t (ht) =  (st) and the constraint binds. The equilibrium wage follows directly from
Lemma 2.
We dene ws = @F (1; s)=@N; which in view of the above lemma is the equilibrium
wage when the participation constraint binds in state s. Then we can summarize:
Corollary 1 In an SNLE with hiring, if at t+1 the participation constraint is not binding,
wages are updated according to (12); if it is binding, then wt+1 = wst+1.
2.3 Using Specic Functional Forms
To proceed to an explicit solution, we put more structure on the problem.20 This will
allow us to assert that the wage updating rule is of the following simple form: given
wt compute wt+1 under the hypothesis that the participation constraint at t + 1 is not
binding; if wt+1 > wst+1 then the hypothesis is conrmed and wt+1 is the equilibrium
wage; otherwise the constraint is binding and the equilibrium wage will be at wst+1 . The
structure will also allow us to demonstrate su¢ cient conditions for the symmetric hiring
equilibrium to exist.
From henceforth assume each rm has technology given by, at time t,
F (N; st) =Mt + atN
1 =(1  ); (14)
where  > 0,  6= 1, Mt  0; at > 0; and for  < 1, Mt = 0. (Mt; at) will evolve
according to a Markov process. Note that for  > 1, F has an upper bound given by Mt,
which given that we are modelling short-run production functions at the establishment or
plant level, may be appropriate. We also assume henceforth that workers have per-period
utility functions of the constant relative risk aversion family with coe¢ cient  > 0,  6= 1,
described by u(c) = c1 =(1  ).21 Finally we assume that  > 1.
20We also need the problem faced by the rm to be concave; concave production and utility functions
are not su¢ cient to guarantee this.
21For  = 1, we can specify F (N; st) =Mt+log (N), and for  = 1, u(c) = log(c); all results go through.
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The targetrate of wage growth (i.e., if unconstrained at t+1) becomes, from (12),
wt+1
wt
=

Nt
Nt+1
 1

; (15)
where   wf . Under the hiring assumption, we also have that the marginal product of
labor equals atN t , so that using (13),
Nt = a
1

t w
  1

t : (16)
Combining (15) and (16) yields an equation for the evolution of wages if unconstrained at
t+ 1 :
wt+1
wt
= 

 1

at+1
at
  1
 1
 

at+1
at

(17)
where the function (:) simplies notation. Moreover if rms are constrained at t+1, then
as Nt+1 = 1, wt+1 = wst+1 = at+1 (from Lemma 3).
We can now state a more precise version of Corollary 1 and also provide a su¢ cient
condition for this to be not only a no layo¤ equilibrium, but also an equilibrium of the
model in which layo¤s are permitted (see Appendix for proof).22
Proposition 1 (i) In an SNLE with positive hiring, wages will satisfy
wt+1 = max



at+1
at

wt ; at+1

; (18)
where w1 = a1 and employment is determined by the marginal productivity condition. (ii)
A su¢ cient condition for existence of this equilibrium is
at+1
at
> 
1
 
 1
 = 

w
f
 1

(19)
for all (at; at+1) that occur with positive probability. (iii) Under (19) this is also an equi-
librium where layo¤s are allowed.23
22We assume that layo¤ probabilities are part of the contract to which the rm is committed (these
could be cohort dependent). For simplicity we rule out layo¤ pay, so a worker laido¤ in period t simply
receives t.
23We assume that layo¤ probabilities are part of the contract to which the rm is committed (these
could be cohort dependent). For simplicity we rule out layo¤ pay, so a worker laido¤ in period t simply
receives t.
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For w = f , condition (19) requires that the maximum rate of fall of productivity
should be smaller than the exogenous turnover rate raised to the power of ; the condition
is equivalent to ensuring that labor demand does not fall beyond exogenous separations
in the putative equilibrium, so hiring remains positive.24 In this situation, layo¤s are of
no value to the rm and they can only reduce the value of a contract to a worker.
To illustrate the solution, we take the productivity series for one of the sectors that
we use in the empirical exercise (see Section 4 for details); Figure ?? displays simulated
wages using the following parameters:  = 0:9;  = 6:6;  = 0:92; w = f : Recall that the
productivity level equals the spot wage. Whenever the wage lies above productivity, the
labor market fails to clear and the larger the percentage gap, the larger is unemployment
(as Nt = (wt=at)
  1
 ).
3 Extensions
3.1 Experience dependent 
In this section we allow for  to vary with the experience of an individual; this is relevant
for calibrating the model. What we wish to model is the idea that more recent entrants
are more likely to separate than more experienced workers, so we assume that a worker
with experience  has a probability of surviving at the end of the period of  < 1; where
 is the workers age (experience). Thus at any date there will be heterogeneity across
workers, although we do not allow rms to condition wages on the staying probability. For
simplicity in this section, we assume that all separations involve exiting the labor market,
 = 0, so all exogenous turnover involves entry into and exit from this labor market.
Workers with di¤erent experience will now evaluate a rms contract and outside
opportunities di¤erently, so the previous expressions have to be modied slightly, and
there will be a separate participation constraint for each worker vintage. The participation
24For a range of productivity falls above this maximum rate, outcomes di¤er from spot outcomes: starting
from full employment in some state at, we need the wage to fall by less than the spot wage. Thus we need,
using wt = at; from (17), wt+1 = 

 1

at+1
at
  1
 1
at > at+1 which can be rewritten as
at+1
at
< 
1
 :
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constraints become25:
V t (ht)  u(wt(ht)) + E
24 TX
t0=t+1
t
0 t
w
0@t0 tY
~t=1
+~t 1
1Au(wt0(ht0)) j ht
35 (20)
 t ; (21)
for t = 1; : : : ; T; and   t, where V t (ht) is the continuation utility o¤ered by the contract
at time t to a worker with  periodsexperience (including the current one), and where the
outside option t is as before a weighted average of V

t (the equilibrium value of V

t ; i.e.,
wt(ht) replaced by wt (ht) in (20)) and U t (dened by U t (ht) = u(c)+wE

+1t+1 j ht

,
etc.), with the weights depending on the employment probability, dened as before.26
The rms problem now is as in Problem A but with (5) replaced by (21). We show
that if the equilibrium is characterized for the problem where all workers separate at the
same time dependent rate, with this rate given by the oldest workersseparation rate, then
this also characterizes an equilibrium of the model with experience dependent rates.
Proposition 2 Provided it entails positive hiring rates at all dates, the following consti-
tutes a symmetric equilibrium for the model with experience dependent separation rates:
wages satisfy
wt+1 = max

t+1

at+1
at

wt ; at+1

; w1 = a1; (22)
where t () is dened as in (17) but now with   twf , while employment is determined
by the usual marginal productivity condition (13).
Proof. Consider a symmetric equilibrium of a model in which all agents have time
(but not experience) dependent separation rates 1 t = 1 t (so all agents separate at the
same rate at t, irrespective of when they entered). For time dependent separation rates (22)
and (13) characterize the equilibrium, directly from arguments already developed mutatis
mutandis, where existence is handled as before. That is, for wages wt given by (22), and
employment determined by the marginal productivity condition, maximizing prots (as
in Problem A) with constraints given by (21), for t = 1; : : : ; T; and  = t (but not  < t)
25 It is assumed that the rm wishes to retain all its cohorts. This could be justied by su¢ cient turnover
costs.
26 I..e., assuming this is independent of age, although this can be relaxed without a¤ecting the argument.
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is solved by these same values. It must follow that (wt ; Nt )
T
t=1 remains a solution to the
problem of maximizing the same objective function subject to the additional constraints
(21), for t = 1; : : : ; T; and  < t provided it satises these additional constraints. This
follows immediately, as U t  V t (repeating earlier arguments), so that t  V t .
To understand the intuition for this result, consider T = 3; w = f and suppose
that shocks are deterministic and such that at t = 2 there will be full employment and at
t = 3 there is unemployment (so in period 2 productivity is high and in period 3 it is low).
Assume that workers born at t = 1 (the old) have a higher survival rate, 2; at the end
of period 2 than those born in period 2 (the young), 2 > 1. As in the proof, construct
the equilibrium contract assuming that the young have the same survival rates as the old
(i.e., at the end of period 2 they survive with probability 2). This will have w1 = a1;
w2 = a2 and w3 = (2)

 1

a3
a2
  1
 1
: The claim is that this remains an equilibrium when
the young have a di¤erent survival rate. Can there be any change in w2 and w3 that would
lead to a protable deviation? Note rst that the participation constraints of both old and
young hold with equality at t = 2 by symmetry of the equilibrium and the fact that there
is full employment the outside option is to get an identical contract from a di¤erent rm.
Participation constraints are slack at t = 3 as there is unemployment, so we only have to
worry about maintaining the constraints at t = 2. In the putative equilibrium, wages fall
at the rate given by the olds Euler condition; satisfying the youngs would require a larger
fall. Suppose that wages are moved, as in the variational argument we used to establish
Lemma 1, slightly in the direction of satisfying the Euler condition for the young, that is,
frontloaded from period 3 to 2; while holding the youngs utility from t = 2 constant. This
would increase prots. However the change makes the old worse o¤ and would violate
their participation constraint as they put more weight on the fall in w3 than do the young.
If instead the utility of the old is held constant, prots are maximized subject to this
constraint, by denition of the Euler equation. So any frontloading will reduce prots if
both constraints are to be satised, and there is no protable deviation.27
27Can this same argument be used to show that a wage change corresponding to the youngs survival rate
is also an equilibrium? The answer is no. It is true that the same logic as above applies to show that no
change to w2 and w3 can improve prots starting from this alternative putative equilibrium. Nevertheless,
consider backloading wages slightly so as to keep the utility of the young constant from t = 2. There is
a second-order loss of prots, but the old benet from a rst-order utility increase at t = 2. This allows
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Suppose that the staying probability reaches a maximum after  periods, so that a
worker with    > 1 yearsexperience remains with their rm with a probability of O;
with O >  all  <  . The consequence of the equilibrium characterized by Theorem 2
is that once the rst  periods have elapsed, so there are fully experienced workers in the
workforce, the updating equation is that which pertains to O: Since the turnover rate for
experienced workers is substantially below that for new hires, this suggests that average
turnover rates are not relevant for calibrating :28
3.2 On the Equal Treatment Constraint
So far we have simply imposed equal treatment as a constraint. In this section we analyze
why equal treatment might arise, and briey discuss existing theories and evidence.
In the absence of the equal treatment constraint, a rm will o¤er a lower cost contract
to new hires in bad states of the world than the continuation of incumbentscontracts.
However, suppose at the same time that the rm cannot commit to retaining incumbents,
so that it can terminate contracts if it so wishes. Then in bad states it will have an incentive
to replace incumbents by cheaper new hires.29 Thus the ability to wage discriminate may
be detrimental to the rm since incumbents will anticipate that the rm will end their
contract in bad states, replacing them by cheaper labor, and this inability to commit to
retain the worker will ultimately increase wage costs as rms cannot credibly commit to
insure a worker. Inability to commit to retain incumbents may follow from courts being
unable to distinguish between a voluntary quit and one that is enforced by the employer,
for example by making working conditions unpleasant, or by dismissing workers on the
basis of minor contract violations. Alternatively it may be that the law stipulates that
the employment relationship is at will.30
w1 to be cut without violating the olds period 1 participation constraint, and overall prots increase, so
a protable deviation exists. In the equilibrium discussed in the text, a rst-order utility increase for the
young at t = 2 has no value as w1 cannot be cut without violating the olds period 1 constraint.
28For example, Royalty (1998) shows from the NLSY that during the rst year of tenure 55% of men
will stay in the same job. By the time they reach 7 years of tenure (the nature of the data did not allow
for longer tenure), this has risen to 90% even amongst the young workers covered in the survey (the gures
for women were similar).
29There is some evidence for a concern about replacement existing among incumbent workers when faced
with the possibility of two-tier wages (Bewley 1999, p. 146).
30The common law doctrine of at-will employment recognises that where an employment was for an
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In such an environment, a rm may be better o¤ if it is able to commit to equal
treatment, assuming a technology exists for doing this, and we argue this is true in our
model. Thus we make two changes to our previous assumptions. First, although rms can
still commit to wage contracts, we dispense with the equal treatment restriction so these
contracts may be cohort contingent with rms committing to a di¤erent wage contract
only when each new cohort is employed. However rms have the option, at the outset, to
commit to equal treatment, in which case they sacrice the ability to o¤er cohort dependent
contracts to subsequent hires. Secondly, the rm can terminate its relationship with a
worker at any point without cost (previously only workers were allowed to terminate).
Thus, although there is commitment to wages should the relationship continue, either
party can walk away costlessly at any point.31
The following argument can be extended to the general case32 but we consider for
simplicity the example of Section 2.1. We claim that the solution presented there remains
a solution under these new assumptions: rms would prefer to commit to equal treatment
if they can do so. To see this, suppose that all other rms commit and follow the equilib-
rium as earlier. Consider a potential deviant rm, which chooses not to commit to equal
treatment: at the start of period 2 it can hire at a di¤erent wage from that promised
to incumbents. It will hire in the bad state at the workers reservation utility 2; i.e.,
paying less than other rms. If the wage contract it o¤ered to the period 1 hires pays
w2 > u
 1 (2) (it cannot pay less because it must satisfy the participation constraint),
the rm will replace these workers. Given that the period 1 hires will anticipate this, it
indenite term, an employer may discharge an employee for good cause, for no cause, or even for cause
morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.(Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1983).
31A repeated-game reputation model is one way of justifying this environment. Suppose that there is no
commitment; however workers can observe wages paid by rms, but not observe hiring and separations.
Firms can o¤er cohort dependent implicit contracts: wage contracts which are enforced by bad continuation
equilibria in which workers expect the deviant rm to pay low wages in the future. A rm may have a
reputation for sticking to an equal treatment implicit wage contract; if it deviates either by cheating on
its incumbents or by o¤ering new hires a lower wage, this is observed by all workers, who punish it by
believing it will henceforth only pay spot wages. Our arguments (which extend to an innite horizon version
straightforwardly) show that the equal treatment contract solution derived earlier is an equilibrium of this
game which maximizes prots across all equilibria, provided the reputation forces are strong enough to
sustain it (discount factors su¢ ciently close to 1). This follows as it is the best commitment policy subject
to at-will employment. Again, if equal treatment is not the wage policy, then rms will have an incentive
to replace more expensive cohorts and given that this is not observable, no punishment will ensue.
32Details are available on request.
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then follows that the rm could o¤er them an equally attractive contract that gives them
a wage in the bad state of u 1 (2) ; and it will have no incentive to replace them. Thus
this is a contract with equal treatment given that the rm will still hire at u 1 (2) (and
a similar argument can be used in the good state), which o¤ers as much prot to the rm.
However we know that there is a more protable equal treatment contract, one which
o¤ers some insurance in the bad state, and so the rm is (strictly) better o¤ committing
ex ante to equal treatment.33
A related argument has been made in the insider-outsider context by, amongst others,
Gottfries (1992).34 In this paper, outsiders have reservation wages below any wage that
insiders might receive even in goodstates of the world, and wages are kept constant in
the face of rising demand to prevent too much surplus leaking to outsiders.35 Likewise,
Moore (2007) shows that if it is necessary to retain at least one worker to train the new
employees, then there is a unique von Neumann-Morgernstern stable set consisting of
congurations in which all workers receive the same wage.
Survey evidence appears to suggest that internal equity is important, although ex-
planations centre more on maintaining workforce morale than the fear of replacement.
Bewley (1999) suggests that violations of equal treatment are unusual, particularly in the
primary sector, because morale and hence productivity would su¤er. Similar ndings ex-
ist for other countries: Managers responded that hiring underbidders would violate their
internal wage policy(Agell and Lundborg (2003, p.7), based on a Swedish survey); in a
British survey, Kaufman (1984) reported that almost all managers viewed bringing in sim-
ilarly qualied workers at lower wage rates as infeasible.Akerlof and Yellen (1990) argue
that personnel management texts treat the need for equitable pay as virtually self-evident.
33A similar argument can be made even when the rm can commit in advance to future cohortscontracts:
it can do no worse than commit to future contracts that are the same as the rst cohorts contract.
34Gottfries and Sjostrom (2000) allow the rm to x a termination payment for workers, payable irre-
spective of who initiates termination, which in principle should allow outsiders to be brought in at lower
pay without creating incentives for replacement of insiders; on the other hand it creates a moral hazard
problem: insiders have an increased incentive to leave and turnover may increase. It is shown that the
turnover e¤ect may stop the rm from o¤ering termination payments. A similar argument can be made
here if we allow for on-the-job search (which does not, per se, a¤ect our equilibrium) so that termination
payments may induce incumbents who nd a job elsewhere to leave, and if we introduce su¢ ciently convex
turnover costs.
35See also Carruth and Oswald (1987).
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There is little direct empirical evidence on the issue of equal treatment. A notable
exception is Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994), who examined the pay of managerial
employees in a single rm over time. They found that incumbentspay tends to move
together, but the pay of entrants is signicantly more variable, which suggests that the
pay of new hires may be more subject to outside conditions than that of incumbents.36
A recent study of Swedish pay by Kwon and Milgrom (2005) nds that if cohort e¤ects
for labor market entry and occupation entry are included in addition to rm entry cohort
e¤ects, the former two are procyclical in line with expectation, while the latter actually
appear countercyclical. Thus a worker entering the labor market in a downturn will tend
to do worse than those already active, but entering a rm in a downturn does not of itself
lead to a lower wage than that received by incumbents; in fact the opposite appears to
be the case (which Kwon and Myersson suspect is due to unobserved heterogeneity). In
another recent paper, Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2007) look at the wage cyclicality
of new hires from entrants to the labor market and the unemployed, and nd a signicant
degree of procyclicality relative to that of the continuously employed. This would certainly
appear to go against our symmetric single sector model, although it should be noted that
they are not comparing the wage cyclicality of new hires with that of those already in
employment within the same rm (or sector).
There are, of course, ways in which rms may be able to side-step equal treatment
norms or rules, for example by using bonuses, varying seniority pay relativities according
to hiring conditions, etc. However, the approach of the paper will still go through, albeit
in an attenuated fashion, to the extent that equal treatment cannot be completely side-
stepped.37
36Wachter and Bender (2007) run a similar analysis on an entire German manufacturing sector for which
they can track workers between rms. They nd substantial variability in rm-entry cohort e¤ects across
time (in line with the ndings of Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994)), but also across rms. Market
wide conditions do not appear to be responsible for this. This suggests that the ndings of Baker, Gibbs,
and Holmstrom (1994) may not reect business cycle e¤ects.
37Suppose that new hires can be brought in at a wage that can be below that of incumbents by some
maximum amount. A very similar argument to that given in Lemma 1 still applies to the incumbent wage,
but the fact that the new hire wage can be lower than the incumbent wage in low productivity states will
attenuate employment variability.
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3.3 Worker Commitment
We assumed that workers are not committed to contracts, and hence it is the ex post
mobility of workers which drives the wage dynamics. Suppose we drop the assumption
that workers can costlessly quit the rm, for example by assuming that there is a mobility
cost su¤ered if a worker changes jobs. Because of equal treatment, very little changes.
If there is a symmetric equilibrium with mobility costs in which rms hire every period,
then it must be identical to a symmetric hiring equilibrium with ex post mobility since
essentially the same participation constraint needs to be satised each period recall that
the hiring constraint is Vt  t; and if the continuation contract o¤ers enough to hire a
new worker in a full employment state, then it will also o¤er enough to prevent a worker
from leaving as 
t
= t in such states; to hire a worker in an unemployment state is
cheaper than retaining an incumbent under our assumptions, 
t
< t, but in a symmetric
equilibrium the participation constraint does not bind so this does not a¤ect the optimum.
However the converse may not be true: an equilibrium with fully mobile workers may not
be one with mobility costs. It may pay rms to choose not to hire in some periods (to
avoid increases in wages) and to let Vt (ht) fall below t. In the mobility case a rm doing
this will lose its incumbent workers too, something by assumption it wants to avoid. The
two cases will coincide if however we additionally assumed that a rm must always hire
some workers to replace separated workers; this could be justied if there are keyworkers
who cannot be replaced by reallocating incumbents and new workers must be hired and
trained in these jobs; hence the participation constraint Vt  t = t must be satised in
each full employment state, which is su¢ cient to guarantee identical solutions.
3.4 Incorporating Layo¤s
So far the model has been solved assuming that the environment is such that layo¤s are
never desirable. If shocks are su¢ ciently adverse to make layo¤s optimal, the simple
equilibrium characterization derived above no longer holds. We discuss how our results
are modied in the context of the example of Section 2.1 by including a su¢ ciently adverse
shock that the demand for labor falls at a faster rate than the exogenous separation rate.
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Nevertheless the nature of the solution does not change too much.
We suppose that the rm does not commit to its layo¤ strategy (see the discussion
of the termination assumption in Section 3.2), and that workers are unable to observe
the number of hires in their rm. (This latter assumption implies that the rm does
not worry about externalities from period 1 hiring on the beliefs of workers about period
2 layo¤ probabilities.) We also rule out layo¤ pay for simplicity. Period 1 hires will
factor in the optimal layo¤ behavior of the rm in period 2, given the wage contract
(which, as before, is committed to). Suppose that a new state in period 2 is introduced,
with productivity a2 = 0:7. The period 1 participation constraint previously evaluated
period 2 utility in each state as (u(w2) + (1  )2) ; in the layo¤ state this must now
be replaced by ((0:7= bw2) = (1=w1))u ( bw2) + (1  (0:7= bw2) = (1=w1))2 where the contract
wage in the new state is denoted by bw2, and the term (0:7= bw2) = (1=w1) the ratio of
employment in the two periods38 is the probability of a worker not being separated or
laid o¤; moreover 2 = u (c) since there is no prospect of an unattached worker getting a
job. If this new state replaces the previous bad state and occurs with probability 0.5 as
before, the new equilibrium has w1 = 1 (the spot solution), w2 = 1:1 (the spot solution as
before), bw2 = 0:91; and employment in the new state bN = 0:77; so around 12% of the non-
exogenously-separated workers are laid o¤ in the worst state. The ratio of unemployment
to the fall in productivity from period 1 in the very bad state is slightly higher than the
original example, which suggests that the quantitative employment response to shocks
may not be dissimilar in a model with layo¤s.39
Some of the previous results are still valid (in general, not just in the example);
the equality between wage and marginal product still holds as already noted;40 similarly,
whenever there is full employment (and hence when the participation constraint binds) the
38With unobservability and no layo¤ pay, employment satises equality between wage and marginal
product in period 1 as there is no future cost to varying employment today, and the same is true in the
layo¤s state in period 2 due to no layo¤ pay.
39Extending this example to more periods gives similar results.
40 If employment levels were observable to workers, then this would not be true. If a rm is going to
layo¤ workers in some state in the following period, the cost to hiring an extra worker today exceeds the
wage as there is an externality on the participation constraint. In the two-period example, hiring an extra
worker at the start reduces the ex ante utility of the contract as it increases the likelihood of layo¤ (period
2 optimal employment levels remain unchanged). Using this alternative assumption in the example only
marginally a¤ects the equilibrium, however.
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wage is equal to the spot wage. However, the Euler condition previously derived for future
states (t + 1) in which the participation constraint fails to bind but layo¤s do not occur
(here, the original bad state), no longer holds if there are layo¤s in other states at t+1. In
the two-period example we nd wages falling more rapidly. The reason is that frontloading
wages (relative to the Euler equation solution) has a benet: by making the current (at
t) wage higher and so cutting current employment, the layo¤ probability in layo¤ states
at t + 1 is reduced, thus relaxing the current and earlier participation constraints.41 In
layo¤ states at t + 1, the benet from frontloading is even greater because a lower t + 1
wage increases employment and thus further reduces the layo¤ probability. This implies
that the evolution of wages depends not only on realized shocks as before, but also on the
distribution of future shocks, making simulation computationally more di¢ cult.42
3.5 Firm Specic Shocks
So far it has been assumed that rms are subject to a common shock. This allowed for
a simple solution to be derived, but the base model can be generalized straightforwardly
to the case of rm specic shocks. This seems particularly important given that idio-
syncratic shocks at plant level appear to be large relative to even sectoral shocks (Davis,
Haltiwanger, and Schuh 1998). In terms of how employment responds to negative shocks
(critical in terms of the unemployment predictions), we show that in the two period model
idiosyncratic shocks have only a second-order e¤ect on the aggregate prediction.
Suppose that the specication is the same as in Section 2.3 except that rm j now
receives productivity ajt at time t. For a rm that is always hiring, Lemmas 9 and 13
41We can see this in the example if we have the original bad state and the new one both occurrring
with probability one third. Then w2 = 0:93 (< 0:966, the previous solution): Layo¤s as a fraction of total
separations are positive in the worst state, implying that this fraction is countercyclical, as is the rate of
separation.
42 If the rm can commit to the layo¤ rate (or equivalently to its employment plan), things are reversed:
we nd that the Euler equation (12) always holds, but hiring may not be on the labor demand curve if
there are either current layo¤s or the possibility of layo¤s next period. Intuitively, the ability to commit
to employment implies that wage changes do not have indirect e¤ects on participation constraints through
changing layo¤ probabilities, and so the argument underlying Lemma 1 goes through. To be precise, when
layo¤s occur the Euler equation holds provided we use the actual retention rate taking into account
layo¤s instead of : This implies the contract would o¤er optimal wage smoothing to those who were
retained (i.e., constant wages if discount rates are equal). However employment would no longer be on the
labor demand curve, there now being a positive externality of higher employment on previous participation
constraints.
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continue to hold (they depend only on problem A, i.e., the rm optimizing, taking t as
parametric). Thus (17) still determines the target wage, i.e.,
wjt+1=w
j
t = 

ajt+1=a
j
t

; (23)
whenever the participation constraint for a rm does not bind at t + 1. We also have
N jt =

ajt
 1


wjt
  1

from (16). However we lose the simplicity of the symmetric case in
that a simple comparison between the target and spot wages to determine whether the
participation constraint binds, is no longer always possible; moreover, when the partici-
pation constraint binds for a rm, we can no longer assert that the wage must be equal to
the spot wage.
We can illustrate what happens in the two period example considered in Section
2.1. First consider perturbing the example slightly by adding a small (multiplicative)
equiprobable idiosyncratic shock to period 2 productivity, 0:99 or 1:01: Little changes,
and in fact the earlier principles still hold good. As rms are all identical in period 1
the equilibrium wage remains as before at w1 = 1 for all rms. In period 2, in the good
aggregate state (where half of all rms receive a productivity of 0:99  1:1; the others of
1:01 1:1), the wage remains at 1:1: The reason is that the target wages for both types of
rm will be below the spot wage and both constraints will bind; as this is the nal period
this implies both wages must be equal (since the constraint is the same for both) at the
spot wage (which happens to be as before). In the bad aggregate state, as the constraint
will not bind for either, both types will set their wages equal to target levels (0.976 and
0.957, using (23) and wj1 = 1) and unemployment remains approximately the same (see
below).
Suppose that the size of the idiosyncratic shock is increased. Does this a¤ect the
relationship between bad aggregate shocks and unemployment? The answer is that in
the bad aggregate state unemployment will be smaller, but it is a second-order e¤ect. To
see this, if the idiosyncratic shock is now 1  "; then provided neither constraint binds,
from (23) and (16), employment equals (a2)
2  1 + "2 =: Thus for idiosyncratic shocks of
10%, employment will rise by 1%, and unemployment would fall from 7% to 6%, relative
to the original example.
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For larger idiosyncratic shocks/di¤erent aggregate shocks, a new case can arise, how-
ever. A non-degenerate wage distribution can occur with full employment: suppose for
example that the bad aggregate shock is such that in the absence of idiosyncratic shocks,
the participation constraint only just binds in equilibrium (so target and spot wages are
equal). This requires a2 = 
0:5. Now with idiosyncratic shocks of 1 ", the target wages
lie either side of the spot wage, and there is excess demand for labor (of (a2)
2 "2= from
above). To restore equilibrium, the lower wage will rise until the excess demand is choked
o¤, yielding full employment but asymmetric wages, with the higher wage rms being
unconstrained.43
4 Unemployment Simulations
In this section we simulate the model using sectoral productivity series from the post-war
US economy to see how the model performs. Obviously the model is very stripped down,
and we consider this more of an indicative exercise than an attempt at a rigorous empirical
analysis.
In the one sector model studied above, unemployment falls to zero whenever recent
productivity shocks are not too unfavorable. Using a multisector model in which each
sector is subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks we will obtain more realistic unem-
ployment levels because it is less likely that all labor markets will simultaneously clear;
moreover when the average productivity shock is positive, there will tend to be more sec-
tors with low unemployment and consequently aggregate employment is likely to be lower.
Naturally this exercise depends on how well correlated the sectoral shocks are.
We use U.S. manufacturing industry multifactor productivity processes for 17 sectors
43With the possibility of asymmetric congurations, we have to rene our dention of the outside option.
If we continue with the setting of the previous section in which workers commit, it is the the ability to hire
which is the relevant constraint. So when there is unemployment, it is natural to assume in this competitive
environment that a rm only has to match the utility from being unemployed (
2
= U2). If there is full
employment but non-uniform wages, then the utility of the lowest wage at which rms are hiring would be
the natural value for 
2
. This specication is being implictly followed in the analysis of the example. The
case of costless worker mobility would preclude asymmetric full employment congurations as all workers
in lowest paying rms would quit in the expectation of getting a higher wage. In the case considered in
the example, the lower wage would have to rise until the risk of unemployment was su¢ cient to deter this
from happening.
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plus a residual non manufacturing sector, as provided by the Bureau for Labor Statis-
tics (BLS), and then aggregate the models predictions made for each of these sectors.44
This xes the variability of shocks and their correlation across sectors, and also allows
us to generate a simulated unemployment series which can be directly compared to the
data. We make the extreme assumption that each sector is otherwise independent, so
that the sectoral labor markets are completely segmented.45 As we shall see, even though
the model is very lightly parametrized (two degrees of freedom for wages and three for
unemployment), feeding it these sectoral shocks can lead to unemployment predictions
that correspond reasonably well to the data.
As Proposition 1 makes clear, given knowledge of the models parameters, given an
initial time period where there was full employment and given a TFP series it is possible
to generate the sectoral real wageseries that would be predicted by our theory.46 Recall
that we are able to solve the model on this basis because of the convenient property that
the solution depends only on actual realizations of the random processes, and not on their
distributions. It is then possible to derive the corresponding implications for unemploy-
ment rates. An example of this exercise for one of the sectors was discussed in Section
2.3. The wage solution depends only on two composite parameters,  and 

 1 . Thus
varying  and  but keeping their product constant does not a¤ect the solution for wages
provided we hold 

 1 constant; the unemployment series will vary with  1= however,
as this measures the elasticity of labour demand by which wt=at > 1 (i.e., the extent to
44We use TFP rather than labor productivity series. See Chang and Hong (2006) for reasons why using
the latter for this kind of exercise is problematic.
45We use this data as it is the only sectoral TFP series available for such a long time scale and collected
on a consistent basis; TFP data for other broad sectors such as services are only available from the early
1970s onwards. It is also extreme to assume that these sectors map exactly into genuinely distinct and
separate labor markets. Suppose however that this level of disaggregation is too ne and there is mobility
of labor bewteen sector A and sector B. Then this corresponds to the case analyzed in Section 3.5. The
analysis there suggests that any resulting bias might not be large provided shocks across these sectors are
not too asymmetric. Specically, if the participation constraint is not binding in either sector, we saw that
this leads only to a second-order error in the two-period model in terms of the predicted unemployment
rate. The error would be larger if the two sectors have su¢ ciently di¤erent shocks that the constraint
binds in one sector but not in the other. Then because the binding constraint censors the impact of the
more positive shock on employment, our model would predict lower employment than the aggregate shock
in the combined sector would warrant.
46To ensure that the no layo¤ condition (19) is always satised, we note that ; w and f only a¤ect
the equilibrium wage and employment series through the composite parameter ; but (19) can be made
to hold for given  by reducing  and varying the ratio of w to f (i.e., for any parameterization there
exists an equivalent parametrization in terms of the implied solution such that the condition holds).
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which wages are too high for market clearing) translates into unemployment. Thus a lower
value for  will magnify uctuations in sectoral unemployment, for  constant.
Treating each sector as a separate economy of xed size, and given values for ; 
and ; individual predicted wage series were generated for each of the 17 two digit man-
ufacturing sectors for which TFP data are available from the BLS and for the residual
sector (whose TFP is constructed as the weighted di¤erence of total nonfarm business
TFP and manufacturing TFP, all in logs).47 An aggregate unemployment index was then
constructed as the weighted average of the individual sector simulations with weights given
by employment shares.48 ;49
We show a number of calibrations in Figure 2, with values for  lying between 0:7
and 1:4 (labor demand elasticities between 1.4 and 0.7) and  between 3 and 10. Standard
estimates of long-run elasticities of labor demand can be larger in absolute size than  2
while short-run elasticity estimates are frequently estimated to be as close to zero as  0:3
(Hamermesh 1993).50 The values for  are on the high side for risk-aversion, although
it is intertemporal consumption smoothing that governs the evolution of wages, and here
elasticities of substitution (the inverse of ) are often estimated to be very low (e.g., Hall
(1988)). The rst two panels show that for a value of  of 0:85, and  = 0:7, wages
fall su¢ ciently quickly in response to negative productivity shocks that there is little
unemployment except when shocks are particularly adverse in the early 1980s, unless 
is set high. The next two panels show that a somewhat higher value of  combined with
a lower value for  yield unemployment uctuations that correspond better with reality.
In particular the volatility of actual unemployment is reasonably well matched, as are the
peaks and troughs of the actual series through to the late 1980s.51 In the nal two panels
47We asssume full employment in each sector in 1949 in order to x initial values, and discard the rst
6 years.
48We added 4% to our simulated series to allow for a constant level of frictional unemployment.
49The (xed) employment weights were taken from the middle year of the sample and the manufacturing
sector as a whole was assumed to be 50% larger than the residual sector - roughly consistent with the average
relative actual sizes over the period. Repeating the analysis with weights varying over time produces
similar results; formally this would however require an extension of the model to allow for variable sectoral
employment pools (although this extension is relatively straightforward).
50Estevão and Wilson (1998), analyzing BLS manufacturing data for a similar period that we study,
found a short-run demand elasticity ranging between close to zero and -0.71 with aggregate data, and of
between -0.5 and -0.89 at the 4-digit industry level for manufacturing
51The spikes in unemployment in the mid 1970s and early 1980s involved substantial layo¤s (see, e.g.,
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 is set close to 1. The fth shows the parameterization that in fact minimizes the average
absolute value between the two series (here, frictional unemployment is set to 3.8%)52; in
the nal panel there is insu¢ cient downward movement of wages towards the latter part of
the period for simulated unemployment to return closer to observed levels. To summarize:
to get reasonable simulations it is necessary to avoid wages falling too fast, which requires
that  and  are not simultaneously too small.53
Recall that if f = w; then  = : A value of  of 0.95, for example, then corresponds
to a separation rate of 5%, far lower than that observed from annual data which is typically
around 30% or more. However, for a number of reasons 1    cannot be read o¤ from
the average empirical labor turnover rate. Recall that in Section 3.1 we established an
equilibrium such that the wage equation depends in the long run on the staying probability
of the most experienced workers, which is far lower than average turnover, and a value
for  above 0:9 would be more reasonable (see Section 3.1). Secondly, for tractability
reasons, we have constructed a model with no layo¤s in equilibrium; layo¤s however enter
the empirical determination of turnover. Thus  is a larger number than the average
staying rate which includes layo¤s. Suppose for example that a sector in our analysis is in
fact made up of two independent subsectors, one of which receives a large negative shock
and lays o¤ workers and the other a smaller negative shock which does not entail layo¤s,
where both started from full employment. If the ratio of the employment response to
the shock is similar in both sectors, as was true in the example with layo¤s considered in
Section 3.4, then although the aggregate employment response may be similar to that in
the model without layo¤s, the empirical turnover rate will be greater than 1  . Thirdly,
we abstracted from rm turnover; if this was included as an exogenous death rate,  would
Davis (2005)), something we have abstracted from. However, the analysis of Section 3.4 suggests that an
extension of the model to include layo¤s may lead to broadly similar predictions, with the layo¤s playing
a larger role in downturns.
52With  varying between 0.8 and 1.0,  between 0.6 and 3.0, and  between 1.0 and 10.0.
53We also nd that wage falls are of an empirically reasonable size. Across the 18 sectors, for  =
0:7;  = 5 and  = 0:95; the most negative wage changes lie between -2% and -3% in half of the sectors,
with the range being between -0.7% and -5.1% (mean of 2.45%). Elsby (2009) charts the distribution
of real wage changes in the PSID over a relatively low ination period (so surprise ination is less likely
to lead to unanticipated real wage falls), 1983-1992; real wage falls rarely exceed about 6%, with a spike
around 2-4%. Likewise Christophides and Stengos (2003) nd from Canadian wage contract data in the
unionized sector that most real wage reductions in the 1990s were of the order of 1-2%.
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measure the ratio of the worker survival rate to the rm survival rate.54
Finally, of course, it may be that wage rigidity of incumbents is due to factors other
than risk-aversion. Even if this were true, the impact of equal-treatment may be analyzed
in much the same way as we have done here (in particular, ongoing research suggests that
the property that wages are downward but not upward rigid follows in a wider class of
equal-treatment models with outside option constraints).
5 Closing Comments
This paper has analyzed a model in which rms cannot pay discriminate based on year of
entry to a rm. The trading-o¤ of wage insurance for incumbents against the desire to be
exible in the hiring wage paid to new hires leads to wages which do not always clear the
labor market. On the other hand, the need to hire means that wages have to respond to
su¢ ciently positive shocks, so that wages in the long-run respond to productivity move-
ments. We nd that these two features imply that the model gives a reasonable account
of unemployment uctuations in recent US history.
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5.1 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
(i) We have just shown that wt+1 must equal one of the arguments of the max operator,
depending on whether or not the participation constraint binds at t+1. Suppose rst that


at+1
at

wt > at+1, which given  > 1, can be rewritten as wt >
 
a 1t a

t+1
 1=( 1).
Suppose that the participation constraint binds at t + 1 (so wt+1 = at+1 and Nt+1 = 1)
contrary to assertion. Lemma 1 implies that
wt+1
wt


Nt
Nt+1
 1

with equality unless the
participation constraint binds at t+1. Thus at+1=wt 

a
1

t w
  1

t =1
1=
, or equivalently
wt 
 
a 1t a

t+1
 1=( 1). So we have a contradiction. Alternatively, suppose that


at+1
at

wt < at+1, and suppose that wt+1 = 

at+1
at

wt . But this implies that labor
demand exceeds unity, which is incompatible with equilibrium. Finally if 

at+1
at

wt =
at+1; then whether the participation constraint either binds or does not, wt+1 equals this
common value. To show that w1 = a1; note that in an optimal contract the participation
constraint binds at the initial date (t = 1): if it did not, the rm would increase prots
by cutting w1(s1) holding the remainder of the contract xed, and would still satisfy all
participation constraints. Thus by Lemma 3 Nt (ht) = 1, so w1 = a1.
(ii) Using the putative solution, the condition for hiring to occur at t+ 1 is
Nt+1 = a
1

t+1w
  1

t+1 > N

t = a
1

t w
  1

t : (24)
If rms are constrained at t+1 then N = 1 and hiring is positive; if they are not, then (17)
holds, and after simplication the condition becomes (19), hence provided this is satised
on all positive probability paths (24) is satised.
We next consider a relaxed version of the problem faced by a potential deviant rm
(i.e., where (t)
T
t=1 is xed at the putative equilibrium levels) and show that the rm
cannot improve on the putative equilibrium contract and hence the latter is optimal also
in Problem A. The relaxed problem is as before but the rm now has no employment
constraints, so that it solves Problem A without the constraint (6) (that is, it can costlessly
reduce its workforce at any time, and only has to respect the participation constraints,
which do not take into account layo¤s, this despite the fact that a worker in calculating
his utility from the contract should take into account the layo¤ possibility). We call this
Problem AR.
Consider the static problem of maximizing prots given that workers receive utility
u, so that w = ((1  )u)1=(1 ). Substituting from (16) for N (this must hold in the
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static problem), yields prots of
(u; at) Mt + a
1

t  ((1  )u) 
1 
(1 )
1   : (25)
As  > 1, this is a strictly concave function of u. We can formulate Problem AR faced
by the rm as:
max
(ut(ht))
T
t=1
E
"
TX
t=1
(f )
t 1(ut(ht); at)
#
(Problem AR)
subject to ~Vt (ht)   (ht) (26)
for all positive probability ht; T  t  1, where
~Vt (ht) = ut(ht) +
E
"
TX
t0=t+1
(w)
t0 t
h
t
0 tut(ht0) + t
0 t 1 (1  )t0
i
j ht
#
: (27)
Thus the maximand is strictly concave and the constraints are linear. The Slater condition
is satised by, for all ht, ut(ht) = u(w(ht)+"), for " > 0. Moreover it is straightforward to
show that the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are satised at the putative equilibrium contract,
hence the necessary conditions given by (18) are su¢ cient for existence in the relaxed
problem AR. Thus provided (19) holds, our putative solution solves Problem AR and
satises positive hiring, and so this must also be solution to Problem A.
(iii) Consider the problem in which layo¤s are permitted; call it Problem B (for
brevitys sake we omit its statement). Consider now a feasible plan in Problem B which
involves layo¤s occurring. Suppose we implement the same wage (i.e., utility) plan in
Problem AR; (26) must hold given that any cohort facing a layo¤ probability in Problem
B will get weakly less continuation utility than ~Vt; since employment always o¤ers weakly
more utility than layo¤ by the participation constraint. Since, given wt; and hence ut,
per-period prots are maximized in Problem AR; the solution to the latter must weakly
dominate the solution to Problem B. Putting this together, if (19) holds, our solution is
also a solution to Problem B.
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Figure 1: TFP (solid) and wage simulation (broken line) for  = 0:9;  = 6:6;  = 0:92;
w = f :
 = 0:7;  = 3;  = 0:85  = 0:7;  = 10;  = 0:85
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 = 0:9;  = 6:6;  = 0:92  = 0:7;  = 5;  = 0:95
 = 1:4;  = 3:4;  = 0:984  = 0:9;  = 5;  = 0:99
Figure 2. Unemployment simulations (solid line) and actual annual US rate (broken
line), 1955-2001
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6 Editor
Dear Professor Blanchard,
I apologise that we have not been very quick (due on my part to a substantial univer-
sity administration job and my involvement in the government research exercise economics
panel).
Thank you for your comments. We briey detail what we have done.
In broad terms, following your recommendations and the general drift of the referees
and Steven Davis, we have played down the empirical section, dropping the last (wages)
part, and emphasising the more indicative nature of the exercise. Regarding the point
that the spikes in unemployment involved substantial layo¤s, our only defense is that we
had avoided including layo¤s for tractability reasons. Nevertheless we now include a short
section analyzing layo¤s, in accordance with your suggestions. Within the example, and in
other calculations we have done, their inclusion does not appear to make a huge di¤erence
to how the model behaves, so we strongly suspect that wage and unemployment dynamics
would look broadly similar if they were included. The other new section, again following
your suggestion, is one which briey looks at asymmetric shocks.
We reproduce the points of your report below with notes on how we have responded.
 The introduction probably reects your attempts to respond to some criticisms by
the earlier referees (and maybe others), and this makes it somewhat rambling. I
would just state what you do: You assume risk aversion of workers, worker mobility,
and equal treatment of new and existing workers. You derive the wage and employ-
ment implications. You think the assumptions are reasonable, and you show that
some of the implications of the model t the data well. (In other words, I would
leave a discussion of the literature, a discussion of the justication for the crucial
assumptions to later in the paper).
We have changed the introduction in the way you suggest, postponing the other
elements such as literature and discussion of the equal treatment hypothesis
until later.
 The presentation of the model is fairly clear. Minor comments/requests: Clarify
what happens to workers if they become unemployed. When do they get rehired
and with what probability?
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We have tried to make the situation of an unemployed worker much clearer,
and we now distinguish between two outside option variables to make matters
clearer.
 The two-period example is useful. Keep it. You could make it even more useful by
lling in a few more steps, for example, by writing down the rst order condition.
We changed the presentation of the example, in line with your suggestions,
including a brief discussion of the rst-order conditions, and being more explicit
about the outside option.
 The presentation in 2.2 is fairly clear as well. Minor: Why do you assume di¤erent
values of beta for rms and workers? Because it allows you a bit more freedom in
choosing parameter values later?
The value of the asymmetric discount factors is that, technically, it ensures
that the su¢ cient conditions for existence can always be satised in the sim-
ulation section for some equivalent parametrization (now noted), a point we
had not made clear, and also that it is another factor that could help with the
interpretation of :
 The title Empirical implementationin 2.3 seems wrong. This is basically a useful
characterization of the solution with specic functional forms. You might want
to show a simulation for what it implies for a particular path of productivity, for
di¤erent values of the relative betas for example (I do not feel strongly).
Title changed. We put in a simulation, using one of the sectors in the later
empirical exercise, and we think this is quite helpful for illustrating what is
going on.
 The discussion of extensions in 3 is mostly ne. Use it to discuss relevant evidence
and related lit. 3-1 is interesting, but I did not get the intuition for the result...
Maybe you can do better.
 In Section 3.1 we give our best shot at intuition for the result.
 3-2 may be the place where you review (briey) the current state of play on the
evidence for or against equal treatment (all you need, qualitatively, is that there is
some e¤ect of the wage of existing workers on the wage o¤ered to new hires, not
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necessarily that it be one for one. I read the evidence as strongly suggestive that
this is the case).
Done.
 You might also introduce a 3-4 with a discussion of what would change if there are
layo¤s. (Can you explore what happens in your simple 2-period example?)
We do now have a reasonably brief section discussing layo¤s in the context
of the example. Although some of the more straightforward characterization
results no longer hold, the response of employment to negative productivity
shocks appears to follow a similar relationship as in the base model, which is
reassuring.
 You might also want to discuss what happens if there are rm-specic shocks, per
comment 1 in one of the two reports. (maybe again here, the 2 period example could
be used?)
We have now done this, introducing a short subsection based around the exam-
ple. Again the conclusion is that the behavior of the model is not substantially
changed if these shocks are not too large. The interesting case where rm spe-
cic shocks are very large relative to aggregate shocks is something we intend
to look into in future research.
 The section on empirical evidence goes in too many directions. One referee suggests
removing it altogether. I think this would be wrong. But I have a number of
problems with it, not the least of them being that I am skeptical of tfp shocks as the
source of aggregate uctuations. I nd however the exercise summarized in Figure
3 to be surprisingly successful, and I guess its success comes from the asymmetrical
wage response, which is the major insight of your paper. Thus, I wonder whether
you could not focus on this. Vary (for example) the turnover coe¢ cient (or perhaps
relative betas), so as a way of varying the degree of asymmetry of the wage response
to productivity shocks. For each turnover coe¢ cient, show the implications for
aggregate unemployment, and show that, for su¢ ciently small turnover, and thus
su¢ ciently large asymmetry, you do much better. Then, if the case can be made,
argue that the turnover coe¢ cient which gives best t is actually plausible, given
the argument in 3-1. (Just a suggestion, but an exercise along these lines would be
very nice).
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We now include an exercise of the type you suggest, and display simulations for
a number of parameter constellations to show the e¤ect of varying the turnover
coe¢ cient and risk aversion in partcular. (I think our view of TFP would be
similar, and we were very surprised by how well the simulations did.)
 (on this, and quoting verbatim, a reaction from Steve Davis: Regarding Figure 3,
Im not sure how or why the model matches the data as well as it does, but I dont
interpret it as a success. The simulations underlying Figure 3 rely on a sectoral
breakdown with 17 manufacturing industries plus a residual sector for everything
else. The main success episodes for the model in Figure 3 involve the big unem-
ployment spikes in the mid 1970s and early 1980s. For manufacturing industries,
especially, job destruction spikes and large layo¤-related E-to-U ows were promi-
nent features of these episodes. (See, for example, Table 6.3 in Job Creation and
Destuction and Figure 7 in my comment on Halls paper in the 2005 Macro Annual.)
This leads me to conclude that the mechanism at work in the model is di¤erent than
the one in the data (for these episodes).)
We fully take the point that the model does not capture the large increase in
layo¤s in these downturns (although the model does exhibit job destruction and
increased E-to-U ows in downturns). We abstracted from layo¤s in the base
model because it does allow a particularly simple solution to emerge. However
the new section analysing layo¤s suggests that we might get broadly similar
dynamics if we incorporated layo¤s (this is an area we want to explore in future
research). Our strong hunch is that the model would fairly naturally exhibit
the type of behavior that Steve Davis describes, with layo¤s playing a much
larger role in downturns. We now incorporate a brief discussion of this.
 The next step, which is to look for the wage asymmetry in the wage data, is clearly
an important and exciting one. But, to do it right, and to relate it to the BD
results, is another, full, paper. I suggest you drop it, and, if you want, you discuss
preliminary results in the conclusion.
We have dropped the section.
 Of the specic referee comments. Call referee report 1 that report starting with
This paper presents..., and number the bullet points. I am not worried about
the point about new rms. Yes, the presence of new rms weakens the aggregate
implications of your model, but it is unlikely to destroy them. I am not worried
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about bullet points 1, 3. I do not know what introducing severance payments would
do (even if there are no layo¤s in equilibrium) but you should think about it. Check
the point in bullet 4. And I agree with bullet 5 that the two-period example can be
presented better. I agree with the two points about the empirical implementation.
Call referee report 2 the other one. I worry less about the equal treatment constraint
than the referee. It is interesting to see what it implies even if we do not know yet
how important it is in practice. Check the specic comments. On the theory part.
I disagree with comment 6. Think about comment 5, and check comment 7.
For both referee reports, we have attempted to respond to the points raised,
and where appropriate incorporated changes, except where you have directed
us di¤erently. We detail our responses to the specic points below. Given
Referee 1s misgivings about the empirical implementation, which you agreed
with, we have cut some of the diagrams (as well as the wages part). On point
(7) of referee 2 raised about the continuity of the equilibrium with respect to
the fraction of workers with the lowest staying probabilty we explain (without
having a general proof) that the model appears to satisfy lower hemi-continuity.
6.1 Response to Referee 1
We are grateful for a number of thoughtful and helpful comments.
Response to specic points raised by referee.
Remarks about the assumption of equal treatment: what we intended was a social
norm that apples only within the rm. Given that we have a symmetric solution within
each sector, we also had equal pay across a whole sector although this is not the driving
hypothesis.We have stressed in the new version that it is only within the rm that we
impose equal treatment. Even within the context of the symmetric model where, as the
referee notes, there is no entry of new rms o¤ering di¤erent wages, wage asymmetries
between rms can potentially exist (o¤ the equilibrium path). The new section on asym-
metric shocks actually gives an example of this occurring in equilibrium as well. We have
made the assumption clearer in the revision, and we have followed the suggestions of the
editor in terms of the presentation of the evidence.
About the model:
 Having new entry would be a desirable extension (but we are following the editors
advice in not introducing it). To the extent that this happens when productivity is
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high and the outside option constraint is binding it should have little impact on the
equilibrium as these rms would o¤er identical contracts to existing rms if they have
the same technology. New entry in lower productivity states where the constraint is
not binding would lead to asymmetric contracts with lower wages being o¤ered, and
this would potentially reduce unemployment (although, on the other side, building
in rm turnover to keep the model balanced may tend to increase unemployment
uctuations as it o¤sets worker turnover in the wage updating equation, if there was
less entry in the low productivity states). However whether entry would be desirable
in these states obviously depends on entry costs; being able to undercut the wages
of existing rms in these states may not yield much extra prot if productivity is
low (recall that technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale).
 We now discuss layo¤s, mainly in the context of the example, but we still rule
out severance payments. Severance payments per se will not lead to downward
exibility of wages. For example, in the two-period case, if the rm can commit
to layo¤ probabilities, then it would be optimal to o¤er a constant wage contract
and fully insure the laid-o¤. In the argument concerning the endogeneity of the
equal treatment constraint, it is certainly true that allowing severance payments
would a¤ect the argument. We discuss this in a footnote in Section 3.2: there is
some related work with insider/outsider models that shows that severance payments
may increase turnover costs su¢ ciently to outweigh any benets from cheaper hires.
Preliminary work suggests that adding turnover costs and on-the-job search into our
model may lead to a similar conclusion, but this will have to be postponed for future
research.
 As just mentioned, we now have a section discussing what impact layo¤s have.
 The assumptions concerning what happens to a worker when there is unemployment
are hopefully made clearer now, with the section having been rewritten. On the
particular point raised, the model is that a worker who quits at the start of the
period after observing the current shock can still get immediate reemployment but
with a probability less than one if the market does not clear. Specically we assume
that they are able to join the pool of new entrants and the unemployed from last
period, and provided that some hiring is happening, they will have a chance of a
job straight away. (However, as we discuss in a footnote, the solution for wages
and employment does not depend on the precise formulation of the reemployment
probability; even if quitters had a lower probability than say new entrants the same
equilibrium wage path would result. The reason is that the outside option constraint
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is not binding if there is unemployment, so the rm would anyway not want to cut
wages in this situation.) We have tried to make this clearer. We have also, to
clarify matters, distinguished between the outside option ; which represents what
an unattached worker or quitter gets in expectation, and , which represents the
minimum utility a rm must o¤er to hire (they coincide only when the labor market
clears).
 We have tried to clarify the example, explaining the outside option in more detail
as suggested.
About the empirical section:
 We have now dropped gures 1 and 2. We clarify how sectoral unemployment is
computed, and show an example from one of the sectors in Section 2.3. We have
dropped the point about high verus low ination.
 Following the editors advice, we have dropped this nal section.
6.2 Response to Referee 2
We are grateful for a number of thoughtful and helpful comments.
On the evidence question, The Haefke et al. paper of course does not analyse wage
exibility of new hires vs. that of the ongoing employed at rm level (or sectoral level),
which was the point we were driving at. We have tried to make this clearer. Recent work
using the same approach of Baker, Gibbs, Holmstom suggests that what they were picking
up is probably not related to outside labor market conditions (this was only tentatively
suggested in their paper in any case). We discuss this briey.
Comments on model:
1. We have now introduced sections that incorporate respectively layo¤s and idiosyn-
cratic shocks explicitly (although separately) into the example and discuss more
widely the e¤ect on the earlier results. We make brief reference to the job ows
literature in this context, and play down empirical claims. As the referee surmises,
both changes complicate the analysis considerably, but do not appear to materially
a¤ect the quantitative implications, at least in the example.
2. Du-Caju et al. hypothesize that the turnover/wage rigidity relationship would go this
way. In a turnover version of the e¢ ciency wage hypothesis, they argue informally
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that a rm with high turnover costs (for a given level of turnover) will invest in
means of insulating their incumbents from outside forces, which would involve longer
term contracting and more rigid wages, so low turnover and wage rigidity will be
associated in the data. (It is not entirely obvious to us that a fully edged model
would necessarily deliver this conclusion however.) We now briey note this.
3. We are not aware of any evidence on this issue, although we have looked. Looking
across low and high turnover industries would not be very informative as of course
other factors will a¤ect the relative levels of pay and disentangling e¤ects would be
di¢ cult.
4. It is probably true that high turnover sectors have higher unemployment. Partly,
no doubt, this is due to the higher level of frictional unemployment that higher sec-
toral turnover entails, an issue we abstracted from given the competitive framework
employed. Our model does predict that a high turnover sector should have lower
unemployment volatility if it faces similar shocks. We did some back of the enve-
lope computations on employment and turnover data for 5 coarse sectors (mining,
construction, durable manufactures, non durable manufactures and retailing). We
calculated the post war volatilities of detrended and rst di¤erenced log employment
respectively for each sector (as a rough proxy for unemployment) and couldnt see
an obvious link between either measure of volatililty and labour turnover. A formal
analyis would be too ambitious for the current paper, but it is something we should
look at.
5. Agreed. We now briey discuss this matter.
6. We have followed the advice of the editor, but have tried to improve the presentation
of the example in a number of respects.
7. The point that we had not made su¢ ciently clearly was that because we posit a
symmetric equilibrium, so long as the rm sticks to the putative equilibrium strat-
egy, the participation constraint is automatically satised in full employment states:
because the representative rm is o¤ering the same contract as all other rms, the
continuation utility equals the outside option t (what a worker would get by quit-
ting and joining another rm). We have tried to clarify this now, and discuss a three
period deterministic example.
On the referees concern about a discontinuity: perhaps the rst point to make is
that we cannot let the fraction of oldest workers go to zero holding all else constant,
since this would require either that their survival probabilities are reduced towards
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zero at some point, or that in period 1 there are very few of them to start with, in
which case we violate the constant working population hypothesis and initial wages
will tend towards the marginal productivity of labor at zero employment. Taking the
rst possibility, the limit equilibrium would have to be compared with one in which
the oldest die with probability one at some point. Assuming that everything goes
through in this case, however, then we can still ask the referees continuity question
(and apologize for the length of what follows).
In fact it seems that the model satises lower hemicontinuity: it does so in ex-
amples we have computed. To explain: It turns out that the equilibrium is not
necessarily unique in the case where survival rates are experience dependent: there
may be a continuum of equilibria close to the one identied in Proposition 2. (We
have computed examples for which this is true.) In the revision, we explain in this
three-period example why using the survival rate of the young (period 2 births) to
determine wages in periods 2 and 3 is not an equilibrium. However there will be a
neighborhood of wage changes starting from that which satises the Euler condition
for the old (period 1 births), which constitute an equilibrium. The reason is as fol-
lows: in a putative symmetric equilibrium (which doesnt have excess demand for
labor), as just mentioned, participation constraints are satised by virtue of sym-
metry. In terms of the example that we now discuss in section 3.1 (which should
be read in conjunction with this paragraph), and for which participation constraints
bind in period 2, consider a putative equilibrium in which wages change between
periods 2 and 3 at a rate in between the rate that would satisfy the two typesEuler
conditions (and assuming that solving out for labor demand in period 3 still leads
to unemployment). This may correspond for example to the referees average rate.
Then, varying the period 2 and period 3 wages cannot improve prots for a single
deviant rm. The argument is essentially the same as that given in that section:
if wages are say backloaded slightly, then because this is moving further away from
youngs Euler equation, it is impossible to satisfy the youngs (binding in the puta-
tive equilibrium) participation constraint at date 2, and have lower wage costs. A
symmetric argument applies if wages are frontloaded slightly, looking at the olds
constraint. Hence no change of period 2 and 3 wages can improve prots from period
2 on. However the backloading, keeping the youngs utility constant, does improve
the utility of the old in period 1, which allows period 1 wages to be cut. This will
lead to a protable deviation if initially the youngs Euler condition is close to being
satised, but not if the olds Euler condition is close to being satised. So in the
latter case (only) we have constructed another equilibrium. The point though is, if
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there are very few old around, the gain in period 1 to the old will be negligible (they
expect to die with high probability so discount away the backloading benet) and
equilibria can be sustained very close to satisfying the youngs Euler condition. So it
seems we get a continuum of equilibria which converges, as the olds end-of-period-1
survival rate converges to zero, to the equilibrium which would obtain if there were
no old from period 2 onwards. That is, we conjecture, without attempting a general
proof, that lower hemicontinuity will be satised in this model.
8. There are EE and EU transitions: in good periods those separated go straight to
employment with a new rm; in bad periods some of them will go to unemployment,
and the remaining straight to a new rm, so we feel this is roughly consistent with
Hall, but we have tried to clarify this point now.
Comments on the empirical part:
1. We have deleted this now.
2. We now briey mention rm turnover. Assuming it was exogenous, would introduce
some rm heterogeneity until the particpation constraints bind for the new entrants
(assuming they have identical technology). In terms of the wage updating, the
possibility of rm turnover would go the opposite way to the exogenous worker
turnover. On the other hand, new entry in unemployment states would diminish
unemployment since these rms can hire at cheaper wages.
3. Increases in e¢ ciency units would, in this model, push the wage up more when the
workers participation constraint binds, relative to the base model, but it would not
a¤ect wage change when the constraint does not bind as this is governed by risk
aversion.
4. We have dropped it. What is suggested would be a useful exercise, but probably
out of place given we are playing down the empirical section relative to the earlier
version (although worth pursuing in future work).
5. We have deleted this section following the editors advice.
6. Ditto.
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